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MOVE OVER MARCUS WELBY, M.D. AND
MAKE WAY FOR MANAGED CARE: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF CAPITATION, GAG
CLAUSES, AND ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING
I. INTRODUCTION-SAY GOODBYE TO THE GOOD OL' DAYS

Imagine you are awakened one morning by severe abdominal pain. As
the day progresses, the pain does not go away; in fact, the pain gets worse
and you begin experiencing rectal bleeding. You have health insurance
through a health maintenance organization (HMO) so you contact your
primary-care physician, Dr. Wong, and arrange an examination. Dr. Wong
examines you and runs a battery of tests to attempt to diagnose your
condition. Dr. Wong preliminarily determines that you have rectal cancer.
She wants an oncologist, a cancer specialist, to examine you and confirm
the diagnosis. However, Dr. Wong receives $35 per month from your
insurer for all of the primary care that you require. If she refers you to a
specialist, Dr. Wong must pay the specialist's fees herself, since your $35
capitated fee will not cover the specialist's fees. After considering the
economic impact of her decision, Dr. Wong decides not to refer you to a
specialist.
Dr. Wong though, is torn between her economic self-interest and your
best interests. She struggles to reconcile her decision with the ethical
precepts of the medical profession. She recalls the oath she took upon
joining the medical profession, "First do no harm." The guilt tears at her
conscience and Dr. Wong asks you to come in to see her. She informs you
of her diagnosis and confesses that her economic self-interest got in the way
of her ethical obligations. She describes to you a process she calls
"capitation," which is the method your HMO uses to compensate her a
fixed amount per patient, regardless of the amount of care she provides.
Although you empathize with the precarious position in which Dr.
Wong finds herself, you can no longer trust her. Consequently, you change
to another HMO and select Dr. Lopez as your primary-care physician. Dr.
Lopez believes that he can confirm your diagnosis through a particular test
and thus would not have to refer you to an oncologist. However, your new
HMO does not cover that test. Dr. Lopez wants to tell you about the test;
in fact, he knows he has an ethical and maybe even a legal obligation to tell
you about this option. However, Dr. Lopez knows that if he tells you
about the non-covered treatment, your HMO could prevent him from
participating in the plan by using the "gag clause" that the HMO included
in his contract. After much reflection, Dr. Lopez decides not to tell you
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about the test and instead uses a less accurate test which is covered by your
HMO.
Even though Dr. Lopez keeps quiet, your HMO terminates him
anyway. The HMO decides that Dr. Lopez orders too many tests and
refers too many patients to specialists and those practices affect the HMO's
bottom line. Your HMO terminates Dr. Lopez because it concludes that
Dr. Lopez is economically inefficient, even though the HMO acknowledges
that the quality of Dr. Lopez' care is unquestionably good. He just costs
the HMO too much money.
Capitation, gag clauses, and economic credentialing present just three
of the dilemmas that doctors face in a managed care environment. The
days of practicing medicine like Marcus Welby, the television character of
another era, are gone. Consider the following description of the physicianpatient relationship in the 1950s:
It's up to every doctor to learn to give his patient something besides
a pill. If the patient is not too ill, and especially when he is convalescent, sit and talk with him a while about some subject that interests him.
Tell him a new joke if you have one on tap; make him smile before you
leave if possible. '
The relationship that physicians and patients enjoyed in the 1950s is
considerably different from the relationship of today, especially after the
advent of managed care. Managed care, which has come under considerable attack by both patients and physicians, has shifted many of the
traditional health care paradigms. For example, capitation has replaced the
traditional fee-for-service model. 2 In addition, patients formerly believed
that they should have access to the latest medical technology and any
available medical treatments, regardless of the costs or benefits.' In fact,
it was not unusual for patients to believe that the more services that a
physician provided, the better the care." Managed care replaces that
paradigm in favor of health care rationing.
Managed care is defined as "[a]ny type of intervention in the delivery
and financing of health care that is intended to eliminate unnecessary and

1. Laurel Shackelford, The Patient or 'the Plan': For Doctors, Who is Boss?, COURIERJOURNAL (Louisville), Nov. 3, 1996, at ID (quoting Dr. Edwin A. Davis).
2. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the fee-for-service
model.
3. See Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO: Managed Careis CertainlyBringingDown America's
Medical Costs, But it is also Raising the Question of Whether Patients, Especially Those with Severe
Illnesses, Can Still Trust Their Doctors, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44, 45.
4. See Carol Gentry, Doctors as Double Agents, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at ID.
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inappropriate care and to reduce costs." 5 Generally, managed care is a
health care system that manages the financing and delivery of health care
services so that health care is provided more effectively and for less
money. 6 Managed care evolved as a means to put the brakes on out-ofcontrol health care costs caused primarily by the third-party payment
system.7 The third-party payment system offers no incentive to contain
health care costs because the people buying health care services are not the
consumers! Rather, physicians sell health care services to patients through
insurers.' Thus, the patient receives services, but a third party, not the
patient, pays for those services.'" The injection of managed care into the
third-party payment system has helped arrest the rise in health care
premiums, from double-digit inflation in previous years to just a two
percent increase in 1995."
Managed care troubles patients because it involves the rationing of
health care, which some would argue is antithetical to the health care
system in the United States.' 2 Physicians resent the changes that accompany managed care because they have always resisted efforts by
outsiders to change the medical profession." In addition, managed care
intrudes upon the unquestioned autonomy that physicians enjoyed before the
arrival of managed care."
Despite these concerns, today, many physicians and other health care
professionals provide health care through a web of managed-care organizations (MCOs).15 Over fifty million Americans, 6 three million of whom
are Texans, are enrolled in some sort of managed-care plan.' Currently,
about twenty percent of Texans are enrolled in HMOs and about forty
percent are enrolled in preferred provider organizations (PPOs). " Without
5. Deven C. McGraw, FinancialIncentives to Limit Services: Should Physiciansbe Required
to Disclose these to Patients?. 83 GEo. L.J. 1821, 1825 (1995) (quoting KATHRYN LANGWELL,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF MANAGED CARE ON USE AND COSTS OF HEALTH
SERVICES 22 (1992)).
6. See John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Managed Care, 327 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 742, 742 (1992).
7. See M. Stanton Evans et a., The Trouble With HMOs, CONSUMERS' REs., July 1995, at 10,
11.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See 40 States Trying to Bandage HMO Ills, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 1996, at IA.
12. See MICHAEL E. CAFFERKY, MANAGED CARE & YOU: THE CONSUMER GUIDE TO
MANAGING YOUR HEALTH CARE 89 (1995).
13. See Richard H. Egdahl & Cynthia H. Taft, Financial Incentives to Physicians, 315 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 59, 59 (1986).
14. See Iglehart, supra note 6, at 742-43.
15. See id. at 743.
16. See CAFFERKY, supra note 12, at 12.
17. See id. at 3.
18. See Terrence Stutz, Senate Bills May Expand HMO Patients' Rights, Protections, DALLAS
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question, managed care has altered the face of health care delivery in the
United States. Some contend that not all of the changes brought about by
managed care are wise.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine three foundational, yet
controversial, areas of managed care: financial incentives to physicians,
gag orders in physician contracts, and economic credentialing. Part II
introduces managed care by examining its history and the types of MCOs
that have developed over the years. Part III analyzes physician financial
incentives, gag orders, and economic credentialing to determine whether,
in fact, these managed-care mechanisms truly raise a Hobson's choice for
physicians or whether they provide workable solutions to the health care
crisis.
II. EBBS AND FLOWS OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES

Contrary to public opinion, managed care is not a new philosophy., 9
Originally developed to entice immigrants into certain parts of the
country, managed care is at least partially responsible for holding health
care costs steady. 2 In the process of containing costs, MCOs have taken
on a life of their own by transforming from the traditional HMO into other
kinds of business structures.22
A. Historical Perspective of Managed Care-The Early Years
The fee-for-service model is the traditional form of health care where
indemnity insurers reimburse doctors and hospitals for all of the care that
they provide.'
Under the fee-for-service system, a patient's insurance
company pays physicians and other health care professionals for each
particular service they provide to the insured patient, rather than paying the
physician a fixed payment per patient or a salary.24 The fee-for-service
model encourages doctors and hospitals to overtreat patients because they
accumulate revenues for each and every procedure they perform.
The

MORNING NEWs, Jan. 31, 1997, at 23A.
19. See Robert Kutmer, Mutant HMOs, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1997, at A19.
20. See Emily Friedman, Capitation, Integration, and Managed Care: Lessons From Early
Experiments, 275 JAMA 957, 957-59 (1996).
21. See 40 States Trying to Bandage HMO Ills, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 15, 1996, at IA.
22. See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
23. See Pamela Gaynor, Some Definitions Can Make Sense of Managed Care, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, Dec. 8, 1996, at C4.
24. See THE SIGNET MOSBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 314 (Walter D. Glanze et al. eds., rev.
ed. 1996).
25. See Carolyn M. Clancy & Howard Brody, Managed Care: Jekyll or Hyde?, 273 JAMA
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notion of overtreating patients is significant, not only because the end result
is the overcharging of patients, but also because providing unnecessary
services increases the patient's odds of iatrogenic injury, which is injury
caused by doctors and health care institutions through treatment or
diagnosis .'
The influx of immigrants into the United States during the 1800s
ignited the development of managed-care organizations in the United States
because employers often included health care as part of an immigrant's
compensation or used health care benefits to induce immigrants to work in
remote areas of the country.27 At least one health care plan, which
resembled today's HMO, existed as early as 1849.1 Dr. Michael Shadid,
a United States immigrant, created the first capitated physician-hospital
organization (PHO) in 1931.29
The early managed-care plans resembled the Kaiser-Permanente Health
3
Plan, which was created in the 1940s and continues to exist today. 0
Kaiser-Permanente's medical group employed physicians who practiced in
facilities owned by the health plan and who provided medical care for a
fixed monthly premium . 3 The early managed-care plans were not highly
successful, however, because they were unpopular among the medical
establishment and they competed against the more traditional fee-for-service
model of health care delivery.32
President Richard Nixon transformed the managed-care plans of the
1930s and 1940s into what is known today as an HMO by, among other
things, signing into law the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
(Act). a Congress expected that the Act would slow escalating health care
expenditures by increasing the number of HMOs, thereby stimulating
competition.3 The federal government's belief in managed care was so
strong that it provided subsidies to help HMOs get started. 35 Although the
Nixon Administration failed to meet its goal of creating 1,700 HMOs, it

338, 338 (1995).
26. See BARRY R. FURROW Er AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 24 (2d

ed. West Publishing 1991); Doctors Sue to Fight Economic Credentialing, 48 MED. & HEALTH, Oct.
3, 1994, at 1.
27. See Friedman, supra note 20, at 957-58.
28. See id. at 957 (referring to La Socit6 Franqaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle founded in San
Francisco, California).
29. See id. at 959 (referring to the Community Cooperative Hospital of Elk City, Oklahoma).
30. See Iglehart, supra note 6, at 743.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 743-44; see also supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
fee-for-service model.
33. Health Maintenance Organization Act of Dec. 29, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)).
34. See Iglehart, supra note 6, at 744.
35. See id.
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nevertheless set the foundation for major changes, the effects of which
continue to exist today. 6 First, the popularity of HMOs surged during the
1980s.37 Second, the 1980s saw countless nonprofit health care entities
convert into for-profit enterprises. 38
B. The 1990s-Mergersand Acquisitions are Booming in Health Care
In the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions epitomize the trend in the
health-care industry as hospitals merge to gain market share and realize
economies of scale.39 Merger and acquisition activity in the Texas health
care industry is booming. In fact, Texas led the country in hospital
closures in 1996, principally as a consequence of MCOs' cost-cutting
measures.4
Recent examples of hospital mergers in Texas include
Parkland Memorial Hospital of Dallas' proposed merger with Children's
Medical Center, Zale Lipshy University Hospital and Texas Southwestern
Medical Center at Dallas, 4' and Tenet Healthcare's bid for the Baylor
Health Care System. 2 Mergers, though, are not limited to hospitals; 1996
marked the first acquisition of an HMO, U.S. Healthcare, by an insurance
company, Aetna Life and Casualty Company.43 Plans are also under way
for Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation to acquire Blue-Cross & BlueShield of Ohio for $299.5 million. '
One report estimated that fifteen percent of all private hospitals were
involved in a merger, acquisition, or joint venture in 1996. 45 Two MCOs
clearly dominate the industry as a result of merger and acquisition activity:
(1) Columbia/HCA, with 300-plus hospitals; and (2) Tenet Healthcare
Corporation and Ornda HealthCorporation which, after a planned merger,
will hold 126 hospitals.' As an illustration of their market dominance,

36. See id.
37. See id. Enrollment in HMOs increased by almost 29 million during the 1980s. See id.
38. See Kutmer, supra note 19, at A19.
39. See HospitalMerger: Parkland'sCommitment to PoorHasn'tChanged, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Nov. 17, 1996, at 2J.
40. See Frank Bass, Texas Led U.S. In Hospitals Shutting Down, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1997,
at TI.
41. See Bill Deener, Girdingfor an Attack: 3 Hospitals, Medical School Doctors Plan Merger
to Fight Networks, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 1, 1996, at IH.
42. See Bill Deener, Tenet Interested in Baylor Hospital: Chain is 2nd-largest Health Facility
in U.S., DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 25, 1997, at IA.
43. See Aetna and U.S. Healthcare: Yet More ofthe Same Medicine, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996,
at 67.
44. See Diane Solov & Mark Tatge, Playing the Blues: Trio Brought Ohio's Largest Health
InsurerSuccess, Power But Now Face Criticismas They Pursue a ControversialMerger, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Jan. 19, 1997, at IA.
45. See 15% of Hospitals Involved in Mergers, CI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at 16.
46. See id.
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Columbia/HCA and Tenet Healthcare own all of the major private hospitals
in El Paso.4
C. ABCs of Managed Care-Types of Managed Care Organizations
Almost 140 million Americans use some sort of MCO to meet their
health care needs. 4' MCOs, which are beginning to dominate the health
care industry, represent a sort of alphabet soup with acronyms like HMO,
POS, IPA, and PPO to name a few.
1. Health Maintenance Organization
The most commonly recognized MCO structure is the Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO).49 Under this structure, an HMO
provides a certain set of services in exchange for prepaid premiums.' A
staff-model HMO directly employs physicians, while a group-model HMO
contracts with physicians who deliver the health care services. 5 ' An HMO
may not pay for services unless patients receive their medical care from a
health care provider who is part of "the network," meaning an employee
or contractor of the HMO.52 A customer selects a physician from an
authorized list of physicians to serve as the customer's primary-care
physician.53 The primary-care physician, in turn, either provides routine
services for the patient or, alternatively, refers the patient to a specialist if

47. See Rex Dalton, El Paso on Health Care Frontier,SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 21,
1996, at Al. Health care mergers have antitrust implications. See generally Robert J. Enders &
Thomas A. Papageorge, Managed Care and Antitrust: The Divergent Views of Government and
Providers, 18 WHrIrrER L. REv. 121, 122 (1996) (discussing the issuance by the Federal Trade
Commission of the "Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care Area"); Mark L.
Glassman, Can HMOs Wield Market Power? Assessing Antitrust Liability in the Imperfect Marketfor
Health CareFinancing, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 91, 107 (1996) (discussing possible antitrust ramifications
as "health care market matures"); Nancy L. Sander, Note, Health CareAlliances: Good Medicine For
An Ailing Health Care Industry, or Antitrust Illnesses to Fence In?, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 687, 696
(1996) (stating that "health care providers face the same liability and can assert the same defenses as
other types of businesses in antitrust actions"). Antitrust issues are beyond the scope of this article.
48. See Families USA, HMO Consumers at Risk: States to the Rescue (visited Jan. 17, 1997)
< http://epn.org/families/farisk.htld >.
49. See Seema R. Shah, Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical Malpractice
Claims: A Response to PacifiCare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1545, 1459 (1996).
50. See TERRY 0. TOTTENHAM Er AL., FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI, L.L.P., TEXAS MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE 288 (11 th ed. 1996).

51. See CAFFERKY, supranote 12, at 19-20. A network model exists when the HMO contracts
with two or more medical groups. See id. at 20. The staff-model HMO is not used in Texas because
Texas prohibits corporations from practicing medicine or directly employing physicians to practice
medicine. See TOTrENHAM ET AL., supra note 50, at 288.
52. See TOT'ENHAM, Er AL., supra note 50, at 288.
53. See CAFFERKY, supra note 12, at 57-58.
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the HMO concurs with the physician that a referral is appropriate.' The
point of service plan (POS) is a variation of the HMO.55 The POS enables
customers to pay more to see5 6physicians and other health care providers
outside of the HMO network.
2. Independent PracticeAssociation
An Independent Practice Association (IPA) is similar to an HMO
except that the physicians contract with the IPA which in turn, contracts
with HMOs." Consequently, the IPA, rather than the HMO, compensates
the physicians and it is the IPA, not the HMO, which makes treatment
decisions."5
The IPA serves as an intermediary between a panel of
physicians and the insurer.5 9
3. PreferredProviderOrganization
A Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) is an arrangement whereby
physicians and hospitals contract with the PPO to provide medical care at
discounted rates.' A PPO patient can go outside of the PPO network if
the patient pays more.6' In addition, a patient can use any provider on the
PPO list, without obtaining a referral from a primary-care physician.62
III. THE DIAGNOSIS-MANAGED

CARE DILEMMAS

Regardless of the form the MCO takes, all managed-care entities share
some similar characteristics in their quest to contain health care costs.
First, MCOs may provide financial incentives, such as capitated payments
and bonus/withhold arrangements to their providers.6 3 These financial
incentives attempt to make providers fiscally accountable by tethering
providers' level of compensation to the amount of care that they deliver.'
Second, MCOs may insert gag clauses in their providers' contracts to

54.

See id. at 28.

55.

See id. at 21-22.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 21.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 23.

61. See Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 297 (1995).
62. See Gaynor, supra note 23, at C4.
63. See McGraw, supra note 5, at 1827-28.
64. See DAVID W. LEE, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CAPITATION: THE PHYSICIAN'S
GUIDE 54 (Mark J. Segal et al. eds., 1995).
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protect proprietary information.6 5 The reality is that many MCOs are forprofit enterprises that compete with one another, so the need to protect
proprietary information is clear.'
However, gag clauses may prevent
physicians from making all required disclosures to their patients or from
referring patients to specialists.67 Third, MCOs perform utilization
reviews, which involve an evaluation of patients' treatment, either before
or after the fact, to determine the "necessity and appropriateness (and
sometimes the quality) of medical care."" A form of utilization review
involves the concept of economic credentialing, whereby the MCO
examines a provider's economic efficiency to determine whether to extend
or renew a provider's staff privileges. 69 The use of financial incentives,
gag clauses, and economic credentialing creates dilemmas for the physician,
which must be weighed against the success of managed care to contain
health care costs.
A. FinancialIncentives-The Carrotand the Stick Approach
MCOs use financial incentives, including capitation and bonus/withhold
arrangements, to make physicians and other health care providers accountable for the care they provide. 7 Financial incentives are more than
payment mechanisms, however. 7'
In fact, financial incentives are
designed to motivate physicians to consider more carefully the necessity and
appropriateness of their patients' medical care.'
When treatment is
necessary, financial incentives should steer physicians towards the most
cost-effective care, which would lead to a more efficient health care
system.73 In addition, financial incentives are designed to encourage
doctors to keep their patients healthy because a healthy patient will require
less medical care and thus will incur lower health care costs than a sickly
patient.'

65. See Robert Pear, Doctors Say H.M.O.s Limit What They Can Tell Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 1995, at Al.
66. See id.
67. See infra notes 143-215 and accompanying text for a discussion of gag clauses.
68. BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW 321-22 (West Publishing 1995).
69. See infra notes 230-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of economic credentialing.
70. See LEE, supra note 64, at 1-2.
71. See McGraw, supra note 5, at 1827.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See LEE, supra note 64, at 2.
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1. The Nuts and Bolts of Capitation and Bonus/Withhold Arrangements
Capitation and bonus/withhold arrangements are two common financial
incentives that MCOs use to control health care costs. Capitation, literally
meaning "by the head," 75 refers to a method of paying physicians, usually
on a monthly basis at a fixed rate per patient regardless of the level of
services the physician provides. 76 MCOs pay most primary-care physicians and almost one-half of specialty-care physicians by capitation, at least
in markets with a heavy concentration of MCOs.'
Capitation shifts the burden of loss from MCOs to physicians, who
must bear the costs of treating patients when the costs of treatment exceed
the monthly capitated amounts.7 The capitated fee is an actuarially determined amount that is derived through a risk rating process, which takes into
account certain factors in the patient pool. 79 Factors actuaries take into
account when rating risk include demographic factors such as age and sex,
as well as other factors such as family history, income, and education
level. 8° Theoretically, the capitated amount reflects the patient pool so
that if any one patient's costs exceed the capitated amount, those costs
would be offset by payments made for a patient with costs below the
capitated amount.8 '
An MCO may also create financial incentives for physicians through
bonus/withhold arrangements.' An MCO could use a bonus arrangement
to reward a physician who controls referrals to specialists, limits patients'
hospital stays, or patients' emergency room visits.' Withhold arrangements are similar to bonuses, except that the MCO actually withholds part
of a physician's payments to pay for certain services that a physician

75. See Thomas S. Bodenheimer& Kevin Grumbach, CapitationorDecapitation:Keeping Your
Head in Changing Times, 276 JAMA 1025, 1025 (1996).
76. See McGraw, supra note 5, at 1827; see also LEE, supra note 64, at 25-26 (stating that the
insurer bases the capitated amount on actuarial assumptions).
77. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 75, at 1025.
78. See Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation,Advances in Medical Technology, and the Advent
of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 338 (1996).
79. See LEE, supra note 64, at 25-28.
80. See id. at 26-27. Income and education positively correlate with health care utilization
because the higher the level of income or education, the more health care services the consumer
demands. See id. at 27.
81. See Frances H. Miller, Forward: The Promise and Problems of Capitation, 22 AM. J.L.
& MED. 167, 167-68 (1996).
82. See Paul Gray, Gagging the Doctors: Critics Charge that Some HMOs Require Physicians
to Withhold Vital Information From Their Patients, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 50, 50 (interviewing Dr.
David Himmelstein, former provider with U.S. Healthcare).
83. See id.
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provides over a specified period of time.'
remaining funds to the physician.'

The MCO then distributes any

2. Balancing the Good and the Bad
Physicians, scholars, ethicists, and others have levied strong and
constant criticism against MCOs for their use of financial incentives.' At
the outset, it is noteworthy that physicians have always been motivated by
financial incentives.' Under the fee-for-service model, physicians made
On the other hand, salaried
more money by overtreating patients.'
89 Critics of managed
undertreat.
had
an
incentive
to
physicians may have
care attack the effect of financial incentives on everything from the
physician-patient relationship to the quality of patient care.' °
Capitation and bonus/withhold arrangements create a dilemma for
physicians because they create a conflict between the patient's interests and
the physician's financial interests. 9 However, it is illogical to conclude
that physicians would necessarily sacrifice patient care to make more
money. Clearly, "physicians are motivated by financial concerns.' ' 9
However, that motivation does not necessarily translate into a threat to the
quality of care that physicians provide.' In fact, physicians are "strongly
devoted to ... enhancing the health of their patients. "' The Hippocratic
Oath, to which all physicians ascribe, requires no less.'
Some courts have suffered little distress over the notion of financial
incentives. The plaintiffs in Pulvers v. KaiserFoundationHealth Plan sued
the plan for the wrongful death of a plan enrollee who suffered from

84. See LEE, supra note 64, at 1.
85. See id.
86. See, e.g., id. at 10 (stating that most physicians "do not accept capitation"); McGraw, supra
note 5, at 1830-31 (stating that financial incentives "inject a conflict of interest into the physician-patient
relationship' ").
87. See Egdahl & Taft, supra note 13, at 59.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact of Managed Care on Patients'
Trust in Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693, 1694 (1996) (discussing that payment
mechanisms may undermine patients' trust of their physicians); Ronald Kotulak & Peter Gorner, Just
Who is Managed Care Taking Care Of? While Anecdotal Evidence is Emerging of Patients Abused
Under Managed Care, There's Little Agreement About Statistics, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wa.), Oct. 13,
1996, at G2 (stating that financial incentives, particularly capitation, can encourage doctors to "skimp"
on medical treatment).
91. See McGraw, supra note 5, at 1830-31.
92. David Orentlicher, Health CareReform and the Patient-PhysicianRelationship, 5 HEALTH
MATRIX 141, 159 (1995).

93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See THE SIGNET MOSBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA at 387 (Walter D. Glanze et al. eds., rev.
ed. 1996).
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The basis of the plaintiffs' complaint was that the
Bowen's disease.'
physicians delayed a biopsy on the decedent because the physicians were
motivated by financial incentives offered by the plan.' The court relied
on the fact that professional organizations recommend the use of financial
incentives and that Congress requires HMOs to use incentives and
concluded that financial incentives do not cause physicians to "refrain from
recommending [necessary] diagnostic procedures or treatments." 9'
The court in Madsen v. Park Nicollett Medical Center reached a
similar conclusion.' In Madsen, the plaintiff alleged that the physician
was negligent when he did not hospitalize her when she began experiencing
The plaintiff contended that the
complications during her pregnancy."
physician's negligence caused her child's illnesses, which included blindness
and brain damage.' 0' A jury found in favor of the defendants by concluding that the physicians were not negligent in caring and treating the
plaintiff.'11 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its
discretion by excluding evidence that the patient was an HMO member and
that the physician's profits would be negatively impacted if the physician
hospitalized the patient. 3 The appellate court held that the trial court
properly excluded the evidence because that information was only
"marginally relevant" and could be highly prejudicial against the physicians. "'
3. Mitigating CapitationRisk
In reality, capitation and bonus/withhold arrangements do not raise the
evil specter that their critics espouse. First, although financial incentives
transfer the risk of insuring patients from the MCO to the physician, stoploss insurance is available, either from the MCO or through a third
party!3 °5 Stop-loss insurance limits the amount of risk that a physician
accepts because the MCO or the third-party insurer covers costs that exceed
some agreed upon amount. 3" For example, if the stop-loss amount is

96. 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). The enrollee was the original plaintiff.
See id. However, the enrollee died during the pleading stage of the malpractice action and thus, the
widow and the decedent's children continued the case. See id.
97. See id. at 393-94.
98. Id. at 394.
99. 419 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App.), revd on other grounds, 431 N.W.2d 855 (Minn.
1988).
100. See id. at 513-14.
101. See id. at 513.
102. See id. at 514.
103. See id. at 515.
104. See id.
105. See LEE, supra note 64, at 44.
106. See id.
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$5,000, the physician must cover all costs for a patient up to the threshold
amount of $5,000; once the costs exceed $5,000, the MCO or third-party
insurer would cover the additional costs. ,0 The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), the division of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services that administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs,'0 8
recently adopted rules that prohibit MCOs from requiring Medicare and
Medicaid providers to accept more than twenty-five percent of the risk,
without ensuring that providers have stop-loss protection.,°9
Another method of mitigating the risk, that a physician will sustain a
loss by extending treatment to a patient beyond the capitated amount, is to
pool large numbers of patients." 0 The larger the patient pool, the greater
the ability to spread the risk across patients and physicians."' In addition, by combining pools of doctors and patients, one doctor's decision is
not linked too closely to any particular patient and likewise, a particular
patient's treatment is not tied too closely to just one physician's financial

situation. 112
MCOs provide "carve-outs" as an additional way to minimize the risk
physicians accept as a result of financial incentives."' Carve-outs are
certain services or procedures that MCOs will pay for separately, rather
than as part of the capitated payment. "'
MCOs generally carve out
"high-cost, low-volume services" so that if a physician must use an
expensive test, for example, the physician would be paid separately for the
test." 5 Carve-outs eliminate a physician's precarious dilemma of having
to choose between the risk of losing money and not providing a particular
treatment, because the MCO, not the physician, pays for the carve-outs
from non-capitated funds."6 MCOs may also carve-out certain preventative procedures, such as immunizations, "PAP smears," and "well-baby
care," to encourage physicians to keep their patients healthy without
affecting their capitated funds. "7 Stop-loss insurance, large patient pools,

107. See id. at 20.
108. See Health Care Financing Administration, About HCFA (visited Mar. 28, 1997) < http:lI
www.hcfa.gov/about.htm#whatis >.
109. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.479 (1996) (setting forth HCFA's regulations regarding physician
incentive plans).
110. See Michele Conklin, Two Facesof Medicine: Painful Choices Loom for Doctors Paidfor
Not Treating Patients, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 1, 1996, at lB.
111. See id.
112. See Donald M. Berwick, Payment by Capitationand the Quality of Care, 335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1227, 1230 (1996).
113. See LEE, supra note 64, at 16.
114. See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 75, at 1027-28.
115. LEE, supra note 64, at 44.
116. See id.
117. Id.
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and carve-outs help diffuse the conflict that financial incentives present for
physicians.
Patients complain that financial incentives force primary-care
physicians to diagnose or perform procedures that are beyond the scope of
their training and skill because bonus/withhold arrangements discourage
primary-care physicians from referring their patients for necessary specialty
care."
However, as more specialists participate in capitated models,
primary-care physicians will have more incentive to refer their patients to
specialists, knowing that the specialists' fees are also capitated." 9
Specialists likewise will have an incentive to control costs because their fees
are capitated as well. 11
The necessity of MCOs developing and implementing quality assurance
measures that will help offset the potential negative effects of financial
incentives is apparent.' 2' In response to this need, members of the Texas
Senate Interim Committee on Managed Care and Consumer Protections
have introduced legislation in the current legislative session that would
require MCOs to establish quality assurance programs and make that
Another
information available to the commissioner of insurance.'2
Insurance
develop
proposed bill would require that the Office of Public
consumer report cards that rate the performance of MCOs.1'
4. CapitationBenefits Physicians
Financial incentives provide several benefits for physicians. First,
financial incentives increase physician autonomy because they decrease
MCOs' interest in reviewing, pre-certifying, and second-guessing every
decision that providers make because MCOs are no longer at risk for
Further, physicians can benefit from financial incenexcessive care."
tives because the incentives can increase physicians' income.'5 Specifically, physicians receive the capitated payments regardless of whether they
treat any patients, whereas under the traditional fee-for-service model,
MCOs would only compensate physicians when they provided treatment. 12 A capitated system, on the other hand, allows physicians to earn
income without providing unnecessary treatment.' 7 Critics assert that

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 158.
See Bodenheimer & Grumbach, supra note 75, at 1028-29.
See id. at 1029.
See Egdahl & Taft, supra note 13, at 61.
See Tex. S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
See Tex. S.B. 387, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
See LEE, supra note 64, at 11.
See id.
See id.
See Miller, supra note 81, at 167.
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financial incentives encourage physicians to withhold necessary treatment.' s However, physicians have a strong countervailing incentive to
keep their patients healthy. 29 Otherwise, physicians will face higher
health-care costs in the future when their patients develop more serious
complications, which are more expensive to treat.'O In addition, the
threat of litigation deters physicians from undertreating and provides
incentives for MCOs to monitor the quality of health care that physicians
provide. 3'
5. FinancialIncentives Should Not Be a Secret
Little empirical evidence suggesting that the conflict of interest created
as a result of financial incentives jeopardizes the quality of patient care
exists."3 In fact, the data "consistently shows that costs are lower in
managed-care systems, with quality equal to or better than that in fee-forservice care."'
Admittedly, the mere appearance of a conflict of
interest could unddrmine a patient's trust in her doctor."
However,
efforts are underway in the health-care industry to help ensure that the
physician and patient can maintain a relationship of trust in a managed-care
environment. The American Association of Health Plans, a trade group
that represents 1,000 HMOs, recently asked its members to disclose
financial incentive arrangements to their patients.' 35 HCFA has also
adopted rules that require HMOs to disclose physician financial incentives
to HCFA and to make that information available to Medicare patients. 16
HCFA's rules also prohibit HMOs from making specific payments to a
physician to induce the physician "to reduce or limit medically necessary
services to a patient."'13 7 Texas Representative Smithee introduced a bill
into the current Texas legislative session that would require MCOs to

128. See e.g., McGraw, supra note 5, at 1828, 1830; Malinowski, supra note 78, at 350-51.
129. See Kotulak & Gomer, supra note 90, at G2.
130. See Massachusetts Association of HMOs, Setting the Record Straight: Rebutting Some
Common Myths About HMOs (visited Mar. 28, 1997) < http://www.mahmo.org/hmomyths.hnn >.
131. See Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 159; see also David Azevedo, Did an HMO Doctor's
Greed Kill Joyce Ching?, 73 MED. ECON. 43, 56 (Feb. 26, 1996) (quoting a physician's defense
attorney as saying that "financing doesn't drive medical decisions... [a]nd if a doctor doesn't live up
to the standard of care for any reason ... the law has a provision to find him negligent").
132. See McGraw. supra note 5, at 1828, 1832; Malinowski, supra note 78, at 348-49.
133. Berwick, supra note 112, at 1228.
134. See Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 90, at 1694.
135. See Spencer Rich, HMO Industry Moves to Allay Patient Worry on Care Quality:
Guidelines Aimed at Ensuring Consumers Get Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1996, at A2.
136. See U.S. to Curb Doctors' Awards: Rules Aim to Ensure HMO Cost-Cutting Won't Cut
Needed Care, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 26, 1996, at 1A [hereinafter Doctors 'Awards]; see also 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.479(h) (1996) (outlining disclosure requirements).
137. Doctors' Awards, supra note 136, at IA; see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(d) (1996)
(discussing prohibited physician payments).
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disclose the "general types of financial arrangements [that] exist between
providers and the plan."' 38 Another bill would prohibit an MCO from
using financial incentives that directly or indirectly induce physicians to
limit medically necessary services. 3 9
The central aim of financial incentives is to make physicians accountable for their conduct by connecting the physicians' conduct to their
pocketbooks.' 41 Evidence suggests that merely educating physicians
regarding the need to strive toward more efficient health care is not
Financial incentives, however, are changing physicians'
enough.' 4 '
behavior without any empirical evidence that the quality of health care is
being compromised. 42
B. MCOs Stopped Suffocating Doctors, But Doctors Are Still Gagging
Individual physicians and the American Medical Association (AMA),
among others, have criticized MCOs for including gag clauses in physicians' contracts. 43 Kaiser-Permanente used an overt gag clause in its
provider contracts until the MCO rescinded the clause in 1995. '4 The
clause prohibited physicians from discussing treatment options with patients
until the option was approved or from discussing the authorization
procedures with patients." 4 A less conspicuous gag order used by U.S.
Healthcare stated that:
Physicians shall agree not to take any action or make any communication
which undermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees,
potential enrollees, their employers, their unions, or the public in [the
HMO] or the quality of [the HMO's] coverage .... Physicians shall
keep the Proprietary Information [payment rates, utilization review
procedures, etc.] and this Agreement strictly confidential.'

138. Tex. H.B. 893, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
139. See Tex. S.B. 385 § 10, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
140. See LEE, supra note 64, at 54-55.
141. See Egdahl & Taft, supra note 13, at 59.
142. See Malinowski, supra note 78, at 348-49.
143. See Gray, supra note 82, at 50.
144. See Robert Pear, H.M.O. Contracts: The Tricky Business of Keeping Doctors Quiet, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, § 4, at 7.
145. See Pear, supra note 65, at Al.
146. Families USA, supra note 48. U.S. Healthcare has since removed the gag clause from its
provider contracts; see infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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1. The MCOs' Positionon Gag Clauses

MCOs assert that gag clauses are necessary to prohibit physicians from
disparaging the MCOs. 47 MCOs contend that gag clauses will ensure
that physicians who are unhappy with their MCOs will discuss their
frustrations with the MCO rather than denigrate the MCO to their
patients. 48 Further, MCOs assert that because they are engaged in a
competitive industry, gag clauses are vital to prohibit physicians from
disclosing otherwise proprietary information such as how physicians are
compensated or how the MCO conducts utilization reviews. 49 MCOs
also worry that in situations where an MCO drops a physician from the
plan, the physician will encourage a patient to switch MCOs by disparaging
one MCO in favor of another MCO.' ° From the MCO's perspective,
gag clauses are necessary to compete effectively in an industry that is
becoming increasingly aggressive. S5
2. The Dark Side of Gag Clauses
The AMA recognizes that gag clauses that are limited to protecting
proprietary information and preventing disparaging remarks serve a
legitimate purpose. 5 2 However, gag clauses that may appear innocuous
on the surface have a dark side.'
Anecdotal information exists that
suggests that MCOs use disparagement clauses in a negative fashion.l"
For example, a psychologist alleged that his MCO dropped him from the
plan after he told a patient's mother that her daughter needed more therapy
sessions, but that the plan may not cover the costs of additional sessions., 5 Another doctor was terminated from his MCO after he appeared
on a national television show and criticized his MCO for its use of gag

clauses.

16

147. See Karen Ignagni, What Managed Care Plans Can Do To Counter the HorrorStories, 6
MANAGED CARE WEEK, June 17. 1996, availablein 1996 WL 8690222.
148. See Pear, supra note 144, § 4, at 7.
149. See Families USA, supra note 48.
150. See Pear, supra note 65, at Al.
151. See Paul J. Kenkel, CincinnatiHMO Imposing "Gag Clause" in Effort to Mute Criticism
by Physicians, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 1, 1993, at 24.
152. See Michael Pretzer, Why You Should Have Been at the Health Lawyers' Convention, 73
MED. ECON. 160, 163 (Aug. 26, 1996).
153. See id.
154. See e.g., Susan Brink, How Your HMO Could Hurt You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Jan. 15, 1996, at 62, 64 (stating that a provider's contract was canceled after the provider "criticized
the HMO's payment incentives"); Families USA, supra note 48 (stating that a physician almost lost his
contract with an MCO after telling a patient that the HMO refused a test because the HMO considered
that information to be disparaging of the HMO).
155. See Brink, supra note 154.
156. See Gray, supra note 82, at 50.
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Even the following hypothetical shows the potential negative impact of
a gag clause. Imagine that a patient's mammogram exposes a suspicious
shadow.' 57 The doctor would like to run another test, but knows that the
MCO will not pay for it. 58 The doctor is faced with a Hobson's choice:
fulfill her duty to the patient by discussing the non-covered test with the
patient, thereby risking deselection by the MCO or keep silent about the
alternative test, disregarding her duty to the patient. 59
1
A physician has a duty to disclose "all reasonable alternatives for
diagnosis and treatment- including benefits, risk, and cost."'"
A gag
clause restricts complete disclosure to patients whenever the clause prevents
physicians from discussing treatment options that the MCO does not
cover.' 6'
For example, a gag rule could prevent a physician from
advising a patient to extend a hospital stay beyond the time covered by the
MCO.' 62I MCOs have also interpreted gag rules in physicians' contracts
as prohibiting physicians from disclosing the financial incentives they
receive from MCOs.163 Gag clauses could also prohibit physicians from
referring patients to specialists who are not part of the MCO.'6 In fact,
recently a California physician who referred a patient to a specialist who
was not in the network received a reprimand from her MCO.'" The
reprimand letter stated that "a future occurrence may result in suspension
of referral privilege or, in an extreme case, a recommendation for
termination."'"
A physician who was reprimanded by her HMO for
recommending a treatment to a patient before confirming that the MCO
would cover it, summed up gag orders by stating that "[i]t was as if I was
a store vendor and was only supposed to advertise the products we
offered."' 67 The effect of gag clauses can be detrimental because if
physicians are not open with patients, patients will not know when
information has been withheld and thus will not seek second opinions.'6"

157. See Suzanne Gordon, Is That A Hippocratic or Hypocratic Oath?, NEWSDAY (Nassau and
Suffolk), Jan. 25, 1996, at A44.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Pretzer, supra note 152, at 163 (quoting Carol O'Brien, AMA Senior attorney).
161. See HMOs Shouldn't Be Allowed to Put Gags on Doctors Talking to Their Patients,
BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 18, 1996, at 2B.

162,
163.
164.
165.
TIMES, Apr.
166.
oncologist).
167.
168.

See
See
See
See
14,
Id.

id.
Gray, supra note 82, at 50.
Pear, supra note 65, at AI.
David R. Olmos & Shari Roan, HMO 'Gag Clauses' on Doctors Spur Protest, L.A.
1996, at Al.
(quoting reprimand letter sent by the managed care group to a Santa Monica

Gray, supra note 82, at 50 (quoting a former CIGNA HealthCare neurologist).
See Olmos & Roan, supra note 165, at Al.
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If an MCO contracts with a physician in a way that the physician
breaches a duty to a patient, the contract provision arguably should be void
as a matter of public policy.' 69 Notwithstanding that argument, doctors
can be liable for negligent nondisclosure. 7" The Texas Legislature
recognized that a doctor could be liable for negligence by "fail[ing] . . . to
disclose or adequately to disclose the risks and hazards involved in the
medical care or surgical procedure rendered by the physician.' ' 7' The
Texas Medical Disclosure Panel (Panel) determines the risks and hazards
that physicians should disclose for various procedures and treatments.7
If the Panel has not made a determination with respect to a certain
treatment, a physician nonetheless has a duty "to disclose all risks or
hazards which could influence a reasonable person in making a decision to
A physician must disclose all material
consent to the procedure.' 7'
information that a reasonable person would rely upon in deciding whether
to consent to a treatment or procedure. 74 Thus, a physician who is
silenced by a gag clause not only hurts the patient, but hurts herself because
the physician could be liable for negligent nondisclosure. 75
3. Putting Out the Fire-MCOs' Responses to Gag Clauses
MCOs, in an attempt to combat their sagging public image 76 and
fend off government regulation,"' 7 recently began removing gag clauses
from their providers' contracts.178 Further, the American Association of
Health Plans (AAHP), an HMO trade group, acknowledged that some gag
provisions are unclear and urged MCOs to clarify the language so that the
gag orders cannot be interpreted to effect physician-patient relations.' 79
Six months later, AAHP issued an antigag rule, which AAHP expected all
of its members would implement." s
The antigag rule encourages a

169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 cmt. a, illus. 6-8 (1981) (stating that
promise to commit a tort or to induce one to commit a tort is unenforceable on public policy grounds).
170. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1997) (Medical Liability
and insurance improvement Act).
171. Id.
172. See id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
173. Winkle v. Tullos, 917 S.W.2d 304, 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ
denied) (quoting Peterson v. Shields, 652 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1983)).
174. See id.
175, See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
176. See Pear, supra note 65, § 4, at 7.
177. See Steven Findlay, Despite New Standards, HMOs Still Face Regulation, USA TODAY,
Dec. 18, 1996, at 4A.
178. See Chuck Hutchcraft, Humana to Modify Doctors' Contracts: AMA Welcomes Removal
of a 'Gag Clause', Other HMO Plans Expected to Follow Suit, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1996, at I (stating
that Humana, Inc. and U.S. Healthcare removed gag clauses from their providers' contracts).
179. See Ignagni, supra note 147.
180. See Rich, supra note 135, at A2.
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physician to provide the patient with information concerning the patient's
medical needs, "even if that treatment is not covered by th[e] plan."''
AAHP included the antigag rule as part of its "Patients First" campaign,
which also encourages MCOs to summarily disclose how they pay their
physicians, how they conduct utilization review, and how they determine
whether a treatment is experimental."
Several physician groups,
including the American Academy of Family Physicians, the American
College of Physicians, and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists support AAHP's "Patients First" initiative. 3 In fact, the
American Academy of Family Physicians prefers AAHP's approach to
dealing with gag clauses rather than enacting legislative initiatives to
address the concer.184
4. State and Federal Legislation
Notwithstanding MCOs' efforts to deter government intervention, state
legislators have entered into the fray and managed-care regulations are
mushrooming over the managed-care landscape."' Numerous states have
passed legislation concerning gag clauses."
For example, California
prohibits MCOs from including contract provisions that prevent physicians
from communicating with their patients regarding treatment options and
renders such gag clauses void and unenforceable."S California legislators
wanted to go further; they also attempted to bar financial incentives and
treatment denials without a second opinion. 8 However, both propositions failed after a massive advertising campaign by California MCOs
asserted that health care costs would increase by ten to fifteen percent if
voters supported the propositions." 9 Georgia's antigag statute.states that
a provider will not "be penalized for discussing medically necessary or
appropriate care with . . . his or her patient."'"
Similarly, Indiana

181. Id.
182. See AAHP's "PatientsFirst" Campaign as LegislativeDeterrent: Will it Work?, 50 MED.
& HEALTH, Dec. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7993829.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See 40 States Trying to Bandage HMO Ills, COLUMBUS DiSPATCH, Mar. 15, 1996, at lA
(stating that legislators proposed some 400 bills in the first three months of 1996).
186. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056.1 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 3320A-7 (Harrison Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-4.5 (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4303(3) (West 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2349 (Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3407.10(J) (Michie Supp. 1996).
187. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2056.1 (West Supp. 1997).
188. See Daniel Sneider, California'sHMO Battle: Cost vs. Care, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONrrOR,
Oct. 2, 1996, at 4.
189. See id.
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-7 (Harrison Supp. 1996).

1997]

MANAGED CARE

prohibits insurers from interfering with providers' discussions with their
patients concerning treatment options and prevents insurers from penalizing
providers for making such disclosures. 191
State laws are less effective when an MCO includes a contract
provision that allows the MCO to terminate physicians' contracts without
cause with thirty to sixty days notice. 92 A no-cause termination contract
provision allows an MCO to muzzle a physician indirectly, even though it
cannot do so directly, because the MCO need not provide a reason for
terminating the physician.' 93 Some states have mitigated the potential of
MCOs indirectly gagging physicians by including antiretaliatory provisions
within their antigag clauses.' 94 Another approach used to guard against
indirect gagging is to afford physicians minimal due process guarantees
before an MCO can terminate a physician from the plan."9
Members of the 75th Texas legislative session have introduced
numerous bills that would regulate managed care.' 96 Senators Sibley,
Nelson, Harris, Madla, and Cain, members of the Senate Interim Committee on Managed Care and Consumer Protections,"' 7 have introduced
antigag legislation that would amend the Texas Health Maintenance
Organization Act.' 9 The antigag legislation states:
A health maintenance organization shall not . . . prohibit, attempt to

prohibit, or discourage a physician or provider from: (A) discussing with
or communicating to a ... patient, information or opinions regarding the
patient's health care, including but not limited to the patient's medical
condition, treatment options, or other health care services; or (B)
discussing with . . . a patient, information or opinions regarding the

provisions, terms, requirements, or services of the health care plan."'9

191. See IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-4.5 (West Supp. 1996).
192. See Olmos & Roan, supra note 165, at Al.
193. SeeCharterMed. Corp. v. Miller, 605 S.W.2d 943, 951-52(Tex. App.-Dallas 1980, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that a private hospital need not afford a terminated physician due process).
194. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-7 (Harrison Supp. 1996) ("No health care provider
may be penalized for discussing medically necessary or appropriate care with or on behalf of his or her
patient."); IND. CODE § 27-8-11-4.5(b) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that "[an insurer may not penalize
a provider financially or in any other manner" for disclosing all available treatment options).
195. See infra notes 283-93 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Tex. S.B. 383, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex. S.B. 384, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997);
Tex. S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex. H.B. 609, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex. H.B. 900, 75th
Leg., R.S. (1997). As of February 18, 1997, all of these bills have been introduced and referred to
various committees.
197. See Peggy Ficak, Lawmakers File Bills to Protect HMO Members, AUSTIN AMERIcANSTATESMAN, Jan. 31, 1997, at D3.
198. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 20A.01-20A.36 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1997).
199. Tex. S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (proposing amendment to TEX INS. CODE ANN. art.
20A.14); see also Tex. H.B. 894, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (introducing companion legislation into the
Texas House of Representatives).
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The legislation includes a retaliatory clause, which provides that "[a] health
maintenance organization shall not in any way penalize, terminate, or refuse
to compensate ... a physician or provider for discussing or communicating
with a . . . patient . . . pursuant to this section."'
A similar provision
is proposed as an addition to the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies
Code."0 ' The proposed legislation also affords physicians and other health
care providers minimal due process protections.m
Should the proposed legislation pass, Texas would join at least sixteen
other states who already prohibit MCOs from gagging their doctors.'

State legislation alone, however, is not enough for at least two reasons.
First, the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA)m
hampers state initiatives by excluding private self-insurers from state
legislation. 5 Consequently, qualified benefit plans escape liability for state
claims because ERISA prevents state claims related to certain benefit
plans.'
Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc provides an example of
the negative impact that ERISA preemption can have. 2' The plaintiffs
in Corcoranbrought a malpractice action against a company who contracted
with the plaintiff's MCO to perform utilization review, alleging that their
unborn child died as a result of a negligent utilization review process. 208
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the claim,
concluding that ERISA preempted the utilization review decision.'
Thus, ERISA precluded the plaintiffs from bringing a claim that state law

200. Tex. S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (proposing amendment to TEx. INS. CODE ANN.
art. 20A.14); see also Tex. H.B. 894, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) (introducing companion legislation into
the Texas House of Representatives).
201. See Tex. S.B. 386, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997) ("A health insurance carrier, health
maintenance organization, or managed care entity may not remove a physician or health care provider
from its plan or refuse to renew the physician or health care provider with its plan for advocating on
behalf of an enrollee for appropriate and medically necessary health care for the enrollee.").
202. See id. (stating that an MCO shall explain to the physician the reasons for termination from
the plan and that an advisory review panel, composed of physicians and providers, can review the
MCO's decision).
203. See Robert Pear, A Prescriptionfor Communication: Sixteen States Pass Laws to Prevent
HMOsfrom Restricting What Doctors Tell Patients, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 22, 1996, at 2B (stating
that California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington have
adopted antigag legislation).
204. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
205. See id. § 1144(a) (1994).
206. See John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialinginto Managed CareSelective
Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173, 192 (1996).
207. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
208. See id. at 1324.
209. See id. at 1331. The court relied on section 1144(a) of ERISA, which states that ERISA
supersedes "any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan". Id. at
1328.

1997]

MANAGED CARE

would otherwise allow."' Second, state legislation alone is insufficient
because only about one-third of states have passed antigag legislation and
of those states that have such legislation, the level of protection is
inconsistent among the states.
Inconsistent state laws and ERISA preemption laws demonstrate the
need for federal antigag legislation. The U.S. Congress, in 1996, attempted
to prohibit MCOs from gagging doctors, but the effort was unsuccessful.'2 Apparently, legislators were concerned that if they outlawed gag
clauses, physicians could be liable for failing to disclose medical treatments
As
that they considered morally objectionable, such as abortion.
Congress continues to scrutinize managed care, it is likely that Congress
will pass legislation in 1997.2"3 The United States Department of Health
and Human Services recently announced a federal initiative that prohibits
MCOs who serve Medicare patients from restricting the physician from
"counseling or advising the beneficiary" about medically necessary
treatments . 214 However, the edict is limited because it only applies to
Medicare providers.215
At a minimum, it is imperative that Texas legislators pass a comprehensive antigag statute that prohibits gag clauses that either directly or
indirectly prevent physicians from communicating freely with their patients.
It is also crucial that the federal government enact antigag legislation to
prevent MCOs from suffocating doctors.
C. Economic Credentialing-Economicsand Quality Share the Same
Bottom Line
A hospital must credential a physician before the physician can admit
and treat patients at the hospital.216 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAHO) is responsible for accrediting hospitals. 2 ' Although JCAHO cannot legally require that a hospital obtain JCAHO

210. See Blum, supra note 206, at 193.
211. See Omnibus Bill Quiets the Gag Rule Ban, But Advances Other Health Policy Issues, 22
HEALTH LEGIS. & REG., Oct. 2, 1996, at 2 (stating that the antigag legislation, offered as an
amendment to the FY 97 appropriations bill, was not successful).
212. See Managed Care Legislation Seen Likely in 1997, 51 MED. & HEALTH, Jan. 13, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 8688881.
213. See id.
214. HMOs Shouldn't Be Allowed to Put Gags on Doctors Talking to Their Patients, BUFFALO
NEWS, Dec. 18, 1996, at 2B.
215. See id.
216. See FURROW Er AL., supra note 68, at 93; see also Darling v. Charleston Community
Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257-58 (I11.1965) (holding that a hospital could be liable if it negligently failed
to monitor its physicians' competence).
217. See Jane C. Taber & Janna P. King, Caught in the Crossfire: Economic Credentialing in
the Health Care War, DET. C.L. REv. 1179, 1184 (1994).
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accreditation, accreditation is necessary as a practical
matter because a
2 8
hospital cannot receive Medicare funds without it. 1
JCAHO requires, among other things, that hospitals establish physician
credentialing procedures and include those procedures in their bylaws. 9
A hospital's governing board is ultimately responsible for credentialing
physicians and terminating appointments.'
However, the governing
board typically will delegate part of its authority to a hospital committee
composed of medical professionals who evaluate a physician's "experience,
competence, ability, and judgment"'" and make staff recommendations
to the governing board.'
The Texas Legislature has granted hospitals broad discretion in their
credentialing decisions.' 3 Courts defer to a hospital's credentialing
decisions because hospitals are "uniquely qualified" whereas the court's
"expertise is profoundly lacking." 4 Generally, as long as a hospital
credentials its physicians using criteria that are rationally related to the
hospital's objectives and operations, courts will not interfere.'
However,
a hospital must include its credentialing criteria in its bylaws' and apply
those criteria even-handedly to all of its physicians.'
Absent those
requirements, courts should defer to a hospital's judgment, rather than
direct a hospital's staffing decisions, because substituting a court's judgment
for the hospital's judgment could impair a hospital's confidence in its
medical staff.' In addition, a court's involvement makes the credential-

218. See id.
219. See id. at 1184-85.
220. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 1.02(9) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
221. FuRRow Er AL., supra note 68, at 93.
222. See Taber & King, supra note 217, at 1185.
223. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4495b, § 1.02(9) (stating that hospitals can adopt reasonable
rules and regulations relating to physician credentialing as long as those rules and regulations are
reasonable and "free of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or unreasonableness").
224. Walls Reg'l Hosp. v. Altaras, 903 S.W.2d 36, 42-44 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, orig.
proceeding) (holding that trial court abused its discretion when it interfered with a hospital's decision
to terminate privileges of two physicians); see also Hodges v. Arlington Neuropsychiatric Ctr., Inc.,
628 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.) (stating that hospital board of
directors has authority to make rules and to manage staff credentialing process).
225. See Sosa v. Board of Managers of the Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 176-77 (5th
Cir. 1971).
226. The bylaws constitute a contract between the medical staff and the hospital or MCO and
generally cannot be changed unilaterally. See Brad Dallet, Note, Economic Credentialing: Your Money
or Your Life!, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 338 (1994). An interesting question arises, however, if
economic credentialing is characterized as a business decision, rather than a quality of care
determination. In that situation, arguably, the hospital or MCO could implement economic credentialing
without the consent of the medical staff. See John D. Blum, Hospital-MedicalStaff Relations in the
Face of Shifting Institutional Business Strategies: A Legal Analysis, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 561,
587 (1990-91).
227. See Taber & King, supra note 217, at 1186.
228. See Sosa, 437 F.2d at 177.
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ing process less effective and discourages physicians and hospitals from
adhering to the credentialing process as defined in their bylaws.229
The AMA defines economic credentialing as the "use of economic
criteria unrelated to quality of care or professional competency in determining qualifications for initial or continuing medical staff memberships or
privileges."'
MCOs are currently the predominate users of economic
credentialing.n t In recent times, however, hospitals are incorporating
economic criteria into their credentialing decisions because they are faced
with increasing pressures to remain competitive.
A hospital faced with
the potential for its own demise because of aggressive managed care
competitors must focus on more than the quality of health care; it must
strive for efficiency. 3
A common way for hospitals to credential
physicians is through the use of physician profiles.' 3
A profile is
235
composed of statistics that summarize a physician's practice patterns.
A hospital makes credentialing decisions by comparing a particular
physician's profile against other physicians' profiles or against standardized
targets. 36 For example, a hospital could create a physician profile based
on the number of hospital admissions, patients' lengths of stay, and number
of tests ordered and compare that profile to target levels or to other
physicians' profiles." If a physician's profile is inconsistent with either
the target profile or with other physicians' profiles, the hospital could
terminate the physician."
The few courts that have considered the use of economic credentialing
have concluded that MCOs and hospitals can make medical staff decisions
based on cost factors.' 9 In Hassan v. Independent PracticeAssociates,

229.
230.

See Walls, 903 S.W.2d at 42.
Richard A. Feinstein, Economic Credentialingand Exclusive Contracts, 9 HEALTH LAW.

4, 1 (Fall 1996) (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIC CREDENTIALING:
PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS FIND COMMON GROUND (1993)).

CAN

231. See Leonard A. Hagen, Physician Credentialing: Economic Criteria Compete with the
Hippocratic Oath, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 427, 441 (1996).
232. See Taber & King, supra note 217, at 1182.
233. See Dallet, supra note 226, at 326.
234. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 5.
235. See id.
236. See Hagen, supra note 231, at 441. Software packages are available to assist hospitals and
others with physician profiling. See Taber & King, supra note 217, at 1208.
237. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 5.
238. See Blum, supra note 226, at 593-94. Harford Hospital in Maryland provides a useful
example of economic credentialing because it has implemented an economic efficiency program. See
id. at 593. The.Harford program evaluates a physician's days and charges above-standard amounts, as
well as medical malpractice rates and denials for inappropriate utilization. See id. If a physician's
profile lies outside the expected ranges, the hospital examines additional criteria. See id. at 593-94.
The hospital gives a physician who deviates from the expected targets several opportunities to remedy
behavior before terminating the physician. See id. at 594.
239. See FURROW Er AL., supra note 68, at 101.
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an independent practice association terminated physicians after they
The court concluded that the
performed excessive tests on patients. 2'
IPA's conduct was justifiable because its purpose was to enhance its
efficiency.2 4' Courts have also generally upheld exclusive contracts by
concluding that the making of such contracts is a reasonable exercise of the
hospital's power. 2
The most widely cited economic credentialing case is Rosenblum v.
Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center. 3 In Rosenblum, a
surgeon sued Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center (TMRMC)
after the hospital declined to renew the surgeon's staff privileges.'
TMRMC refused to recredential the surgeon because the surgeon had
privileges at Tallahassee Community Hospital (TCH) as well, and TMRMC
wanted to avoid competing with TCH. u5 TMRMC was concerned that the
surgeon would steer patients from its facility to TCH or encourage nurses
from TMRMC to transfer to TCH.244 The court granted TMRMC's
motion for summary judgment in Rosenblum, concluding that the hospital
acted reasonably when it considered the economic effect of the surgeon's
contract with TCH.2 47
Similarly, when a hospital terminates a physician for economic
In Knapp v. Palos
reasons, the physician may have little recourse.'
Community Hospital, the hospital declined to renew several physicians'
privileges after the hospital concluded that the physicians overutilized
certain services, excessively used certain diagnostic tests, and overutilized
The appellate court in Knapp held that as long as a
the hospital.'
private hospital followed its bylaws when it declined staff privileges, the
In reaching its
court would not second guess the hospital's decisions.'
were "not
decisions
credentialing
that
hospital
reasoned
decision, the court
to
its bylaws
subject to judicial review" unless the hospital did not adhere
when it made its credentialing decisions because the court wanted to avoid
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the hospital."'

240. 698 F. Supp. 679, 694 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
241. See id.
242. See Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied); Feinstein, supra note 230, at 8 (stating that "most challenges to exclusive
contracts have been unsuccessful").
243. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 5.
244. See id. at 6.
245. See Dallet, supra note 226, at 341-42.
246. See id. at 341 n.97.
247. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 6.
248. See Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 465 N.E.2d 554, 565 (I11.App. Ct. 1984).
249. Id. at 560-61.
250. See id. at 563.
251. Id. at 565.
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Even though the case law regarding economic credentialing generally
favors hospitals, Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc. provides
physicians some protection against arbitrary terminations. 22 In Harper,
the defendant MCO used a no-cause termination clause to deny privileges
to a physician to practice as a surgeon, but did recredential him as a
primary-care physician."
The physician argued that the no-cause
termination provision was contrary to public policy.5' The court stated
that every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 5 Consequently, the court held that the MCO could not terminate the physician for any reason that is contrary to public policy. 56 In
addition, the court held that a "terminated physician is entitled to review
of the termination decision."257
Thus, hospitals are generally free to terminate physicians or decline to
recredential them for purely economic reasons because courts recognize
economic credentialing as a component of a hospital's medical staff
decision-making authority. As a consequence, little protection is available
for a physician or the public if a hospital or MCO terminates otherwise
qualified physicians to boost profits.
When a hospital uses economic criteria exclusively to credential a
physician, the hospital is using pure economic credentialing.58 Pure
economic factors include the amount of profit generated by a physician,
resource utilization in dollars, revenue per physician, admissions rates, and
patient mix.5 9 For example, a hospital uses pure economic credentialing
if the hospital terminates a physician solely because the physician has a
higher than average number of Medicaid patients. Such a patient mix
contributes little to the hospital's bottom line because Medicaid reimburse26
ment rates generally are lower than the hospital's actual costs. 0
Exclusive contracting is a controversial form of pure economic
credentialing."6
Physicians and other health care professionals are
generally opposed to exclusive contracting because they see it "as a way to
circumvent [their] decision-making authority over credentialing. "I
An
exclusive contract is an arrangement between a hospital and a physician
where the hospital allows a sole physician to provide particular services for

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
See id. at 963.
See id. at 964.
See id. at 965.
See id. at 966.
Id.
See Dallet, supra note 226, at 339; Taber & King, supra note 217, at 1208-09.
See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 5.
See Dallet, supra note 226, at 342.
See Blum, supra note 206, at 181.
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the customers of the hospital.263 Exclusive contracts typically cover
hospital based services such as radiology or pathology, or the contract may
An exclusive contract benefits a
involve specialty surgical services.2 '
hospital because the contract gives a hospital greater control over the
Further, a hospital can consider
physician than it may otherwise have.'
contracting only with a physician whom the hospital believes will practice
in a cost-effective manner. 2
Physicians and medical societies generally oppose pure economic
credentialing, contending that economic considerations are not relevant in
assessing the quality of care to a patient.267 Pure economic credentialing
First, if a hospital focuses exclusively on
poses several problems.
economic criteria, it could be liable for failing to adequately evaluate a
Second, although distinguishing between the
physician's competence.'
credentialing is theoretically possible,
of
economic
pure and hybrid models
in reality the line of demarcation between the two is a mere fiction because
it is difficult to separate a physician's competence from economic factors. 269

In fact, even medical societies disagree as to which factors

hospitals should appropriately consider as part of the credentialing
process.270
Pure economic credentialing raises grave public policy concerns
because it shifts the focus of health care from quality to profits."
Hospitals and other health care delivery systems are obligated to act within
the public's best interests because ultimately it is the public that physicians
Even more importantly, the public must rely on the
must treat."
expertise and good judgment of hospital staffs and governing boards to
competently select qualified physicians ." Yet, MCOs cannot meet their
obligations to the public by pursuing higher profit margins at the expense
of quality health care.'
The second type of economic credentialing is hybrid economic
credentialing, which evaluates a physician's competence by combining
Examples of hybrid factors include
economic and clinical factors.7

263. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 8.
264. See Blum, supra note 226, at 565.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 4 (stating that the American Medical Association and the
California Medical Association are opposed to the use of economic criteria in credentialing).
268. See Taber & King, supra note 217, at 1211.
269. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 4.
270. See id. at 5.
271. See Dallet, supra note 226, at 343.
272. See id. at 343-45.
273. See id. at 343.
274. See id. at 346-47.
275. See Taber and King, supra note 217, at 1206.
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patients' lengths of stays, number of admissions versus outpatient services
use, and use of lab tests and ancillary services.276 The theory behind
hybrid credentialing is that economic factors are inextricably intertwined
with the quality of health care and the two cannot be separated, nor should
they be, when evaluating a physician's competence.' m In fact, a hospital
arguably has a duty to perform economic credentialing because it has the
The
responsibility of overseeing the financial affairs of the hospital."
hospital cannot adequately perform its duties without considering the
economic efficiency of its physicians and potential physicians. 79 Combining clinical and economic factors through hybrid economic credentialing
does not pose the same problems as pure economic credentialing because
quality of care remains an important factor in hybrid credentialing.
Various legislative measures related to economic credentialing due
process protections have been proposed at both the federal and state level.
The Health Quality and Fairness Act of 1995 was a federal initiative, which
would have allowed plans to use economic criteria to credential physicians
as long as the criteria were objective and the plan made the criteria
available to physicians and plan enrollees. 2" However, Congress did not
enact the Health Care Quality and Fairness Act of 1995.2"1 Similar
legislation was also introduced, but Congress was not successful in passing
that legislation either.'
Although Texas physicians are already entitled to procedural due
process when a hospital considers them for medical staff membership,'
Texas legislators are currently considering additional due process protectOne provision of
ions for physicians and other health care providers.'
the proposed legislation would require an advisory review panel to review
Peers of the affected physician would
proposed physician terminations.'
compose the advisory review panel, whose decision is advisory only and
without binding effect. 6
276. See id.; Feinstein, supra note 230, at 5.
277. See Taber & King, supra note 217, at 1206.
278. See Bium, supra note 226, at 588.
279. See id.
280. See Feinstein, supra note 230, at 8.
281. See id.
282. See id. (discussing Medicare Health Care Quality Act of 1995, S. 1024, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995); Patient Protection Act of 1994, S. 2196, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)).
283. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.101(c) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997).
284. See, e.g., Tex. H.B. 893, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex. S.B. 383, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997);
Tex. S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). The proposed legislation would essentially codify regulations
issued by the Texas Department of Insurance. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(4) (West 1996)
(Tex. Dept. of Ins., Procedure to Assure Adequate Treatment) (stating that before insurer terminates
a physician, the insurer shall make an advisory panel available to the physician to review the termination
decision).
285. See Tex. S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
286. See id. Tex. H.B. 893, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex. S.B. 383, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
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Another provision of the proposed legislation would require the MCO
to provide the affected physician with a written explanation for the
termination and an opportunity for discussion.'
The proposed legislation
also guarantees that a physician would have access to the economic profile
that the MCO used as well as the MCO's credentialing criteria.'
In
addition, the legislation would require an MCO that uses an economic
profile to account for variations in a physician's practice that may explain
fluctuations from expected costs."
Economic considerations ultimately impact the quality of health care
because a hospital's economic efficiency cannot be separated from the
quality of services that it delivers.' ° A governing board has a fiduciary
duty to act in the best interest of the hospital.29 This fiduciary duty
obligates the hospital to take steps towards becoming more efficient,
especially in a competitive environment.2' Courts "will likely support
hospital credentialing decisions that stem from quality problems having very
clear cost implications.'"2I Thus, MCOs and hospitals should implement
hybrid economic credentialing programs that include minimum due process
requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION-WHAT IS THE PROGNOSIS?

Capitation, gag clauses, and economic credentialing clearly pose
dilemmas for physicians. Reconsider the introductory hypothetical of Dr.
Wong, the physician who failed to refer you to a specialist. Although
capitation creates a conflict between Dr. Wong's duty to you and her own
economic interests, she now realizes that capitation is not the evil that she
once perceived. Instead, stop-loss insurance, large patient pools, and carveouts help mitigate the risk that capitation presents to Dr. Wong. Further,
capitation makes Dr. Wong accountable for health care costs, which is a
necessary component of cost containment. Dr. Wong concludes that
capitation works; it helps control costs without any empirical evidence that
it compromises the quality of care.

287.
288.

See Tex. H.B. 893, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
See id.; Tex. S.B. 383, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex. S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997);

see also 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(5) (West 1996) (Tex. Dept. of Ins., Procedure to Assure
Adequate Treatment) (stating that an insurer who uses economic profiling to terminate a physician shall
make economic profile and written criteria available to the physician). The court, in Texas Medical
Ass 'n v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., held that no private cause of action exists for the enforcement of PPO
rules. 80 F.3d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 1996).
289. See Tex. H.B. 893, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex. S.B. 383, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997); Tex.
S.B. 385, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997).
290. See Blum, supra note 226, at 597.
291. See id. at 598.
292. See id.
293. Id. at 597.
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Dr. Lopez, the physician who feared the gag clause, does not fare as
well. He now realizes that gag clauses are unacceptable because they
restrict what he discloses to his patients. Dr. Lopez knows that nothing
should come between a physician and his patient. As a result, he supports
pending legislation introduced in Texas, as well as similar federal legislation, that would effectively do away with gag clauses.
Finally, Dr. Lopez learned about the dark side of economic credentialing when your HMO terminated him because he was "economically
inefficient." He concludes that, although pure economic credentialing is
not desirable, hybrid economic credentialing is a useful tool to help arrest
escalating health care-costs. The economic efficiency of physicians directly
impacts the health of an MCO, which could ultimately affect the public.
Hybrid economic credentialing focuses on both economics and quality, two
necessary and inescapable elements in the managed care environment.
by Michelle M. Kwon

